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RICH.ARD JACOBSON
The foregoing conclusions which would condemn any further exceptions
to the rules of character exclusion are in effect strengthened by a remark
of Dean Wigmore in his explanation of the rationale involved in allowing
the prosecution to attack the character of the defendant after the latter
has attempted to show his good character in his own aid. "The true
reason for [allowing] this seems to be . . . not a permission to show
the defendant's bad character, but a liberty to refute his claim that he
has a good one. '"46 A defendant makes no such elaim when he attacks
the character of his victim. The prosecution, therefore should not, on the
basis of either lay or legal reasoning, be permitted to refute a non-existent
claim.
There is an additional practical consideration which should cause some
hesitancy on the part of those who would readily accept the "Missouri
rule." As a commentator on the case has so aptly put it, "the decision
obviously will change the course to be followed by defense attorneys in
many future trials. 47 In short this means that under the minority doctrine,
a plea of self-defense, supplemented by inquiry into the reputation of the
deceased victim for violence, could no longer be unquestionably interposed
without the realization by defense counsel that his client would consequently
be subjected to a perhaps disasterous attack on his character. This doctrine
would therefore in effect qualify a right, heretofore absolute, which has
been accorded recognition by centuries of Anglo-American jurisprudence.4 8
AMENDMENT OF INDICTMENTS AND INFORMATIONS
Richard Jacobson
Traditionally the criminal law has maintained a distinction between
indictments and informations with regard to amendment by the prosecution
during the course of the trial. Because indictments were returned on the
oath of a grand jury, the common law courts rebelled at allowing them
to be amended except by the grand jury, while at the same time generally
the story of the crime on trial by describing happenings closely connected in time and
place: State v. Ward, 337 Mo. 425, 85 S.W. 2d 1 (1935) ; (2) to establish identity: White-
man v. State, 119 Ohio St. 285, 164 N.E. 51 (1928); (3) to show a specific emotional
propensity but not a general propensity: State v. Terry, 199 Ia. 1221, 203 N.W. 232 (1925).
Cf. Wertz v. State, 159 Md. 161, 150 Atl. 278 (1930); (4) to prove guilty knowledge:
People v. Marino, 271 N.Y. 317, 3 N.E. 2d 439 (1936); (5) to show intent, i.e., that the
act was intentional and not accidental: People v. Williams, 6 Cal. 2d 500, 58 P. 2d 917
(1936) ; (6) to establish motive: State v. Gaines, 144 Wash. 446, 258 P. 508 (1927) ; See
also MCCORMICK, CASES ON EVIDENCE, pp. 487, 488 (2d ed. 1948). In addition to evidence
of similar crimes, the prosecution is also permitted to impeach the defendant like any other
witness when he takes the stand. It may do this regardless of whether the accused has
attempted to use his good character as relevant to his innocence. 3 WIGMORE, ]EVIDENCE
§§890, 891, 925 (3rd ed. 1940).
46. 1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §58, pp. 457, 458 (3rd ed. 1940). Language to the same effect
is found in United States v. Holmes, 26 Fed. Cas. 349, No. 15,382 (C.C.D. Me. 1858) ; A
concise but classic statement of the reason behind the rule is that of Erle, J., in Regina v.
Rowton, Leigh & C. 520, 533 (1865): "If the prisoner, having a bad character, misleads the
court by calling witnesses to say he has a good one, in the interests of truth and justice,
the false impression should be removed."
47. Note, 5 Mo. L. REV. 430, 431 (1940).
48. 2 BURDICK, THE LAW OF CRIME, §436a, pp. 122-126 (1946) ; 3 COKE, INST. c. 8, p. 55;
1 HALE, P. C., c. 40; See especially, 2 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, pp. 52-54 (3rd
ed. 1923).
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permitting amendment of informations.' Today the power of amendment
of informations is even more freely exercised, and many jurisdictions have
relaxed the restriction on indictments and permit, at least to a limited
extent, their amendment. But as in the past, even in these jurisdictions,
insubstantial and minor technical defects in the indictment arc often bars
to a speedy trial, with the result that there remains a large area in which
reform might be accomplished, aimed at expediting judicial procedure.
Statutory attempts have been made to achieve this end, but the opportuni-
ties for reform are not exhausted.
This basic distinction between indictments and informations was made
in a classic opinion of Lord Mansfield's:
"There is a great difference . . .Indictments are found upon the oaths
of a jury, and ought only to be amended by themselves; but . . . an
officer of the Crown has the right of framing [informations] originally,
and may, with leave, amend in like manner as any plaintiff may
do. . Y 2
The common law doctrine denying any power in the court to amend
indictments can be traced to the days when capital punishment was meted
out for a substantial number of offenses, and many judges were moved
by a humane tendency to seize on the slightest flaw in an indictment in
an effort to save the life of the accused.3 As this situation improved,
statutes were enacted permitting amendment of at least formal or technical
defects which did not affect the substance of the indictment.4 The rule
remained unchanged as to amendments of substance.5
In some jurisdictions, however, the courts, in the absence of such statutes,
have merely continued to reiterate the early common law doctrine. Included
in this group is Illinois, whose courts still hold that an indictment returned
by a grand jury cannot be amended. 6 Since the grand jury has the
exclusive right to find indictments, the court has no power to authorize their
alteration or amendment.
7
Illinois holdings have consistently been to the effect that an information
may be amended to any extent which the judge deems consistent with the
orderly conduct of judicial business, with the public interest, and with
1. Davis v. State, 196 Ark. 721, 119 S.W. 2d 527 (1938) ; State v. Darling, 216 Mo. 450,
465, 115 S.W. 1002, 1006 (1909).
2. Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527, 2569 (1770).
3. See Note, 7 A.L.R. 1516.
4. State v. Kappen, 191 Ia. 19, 180 N.W. 307 (1920) (furiher description added); State
v. Grimms, 143 La. 421, 78 So. 661 (1918) (names in indictment changed); Ex parte
Hironymous, 38 Nev. 194, 202, 147 Pac. 453, 456 (1915) (omission supplied in amendment) ;
People v. Johnson, 104 N.Y. 213, 10 N.E. 690 (1887); Rosenberger v. Com., 118 Pa. 77, 84,
11 Atl. 782, 783 (1887).
5. State v. Moyer, 76 Ore. 396, 149 Pac. 84 (1915) (substance defined as matter essential
to show that an offense has been committed) ; Calvin v. State, 25 Tex. 789 (1860) ; People
v. Anthony, 20 Cal. App. 586, 129 Pac. 968 (1913) (changing the offense charged not
allowed).
6. People v. Clarke, 340 Ill. App. 207 (1950) (the court, citing the Wilkes case, allow-
ing amendment of an information, but stating that similar amendment of an indictment
would not be allowed). In Illinois, where an indictment is found to be defective, the prac-
tice is to have the same or another grand jury find another in the proper form. Gannon v.
People, 127 Ill. 507, 21 N.E. 525 (1889).
7. Patrick v. People, 132 I1. 529, 24 N.E. 619 (1890) ; People v. Klemick, 311 Ill. App.
508, 36 N.E. 2d 846 (1941).
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private rights.8 Defects in an information not affecting the merits of the
question of guilt or innocence may be cured by amendment at the trial,9
as long as the defendant has not been rendered unprepared to make his
defense to the charge in the amended information or is not prejudiced by
being tried under it.10
The Illinois statute giving the court power to permit amendment of any
pleading before judgment expressly states that it does not extend to
criminal cases,11 but it has been held nevertheless that by virtue of the
common law the court may permit an information to be amended.' 2
In many states a further difficulty arises because a distinction has been
made between "form" and "substance,' 13 and some of these states allow
amendment of an information in form or substance before trial but in
form only once the trial has begun. 14 Other states, however, have held
informations amendable in form or substance during the trial if the defendant
is not prejudiced thereby.' 5
The federal courts have adhered to the common law rule, apparently
treating it as codified by the Fifth Amendment, and as precluding amend-
ment of indictment during the trial.16 Rule 7(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure permits amendment of informations, 17 but, significantly,
8. Long v. People, 135 Ill. 435, 441, 25 N.E. 851, 853 (1890) ; People v. Thompson,
203 Ill. App. 296 (1917) (name of the proper defendant substituted for the wrong name
appearing in the information) ; Bergstrasser v. People, 134 Ill. App. 609 (1907) (the court
stressing that the public officer by whom the information was presented is always present in
court).
9. People v. Perca, 181 I1. App. 666 (1913).
10. People v. Pokora, 295 I1. 442, 129 N.E. 173 (1920).
11. ILL. REV. STAT. c. 7, §11 (1949).
12. People v. Fensky, 297 Ill. 440, 130 N.E. 689 (1921) (the legislative intent in enacting
this statute was to confine its subject matter to civil cases, leaving unchanged the law as to
criminal cases, which allowed amendment of informations.
13. Amendments of form have been held to include the caption of the indictment, the
name of the accused, the owner of property, the date of the offense, and the description of
the offense or property. Collins v. People, 69 Colo. 353, 195 Pac. 525 (1920) (owner of
property) ; State v. Foxton, 166 Ia. 181, 200, 147 N.W. 347, 354- (1915) (statute allowing
amendment of errors or omissions of form, including description of any person or thing, as
long as there is no prejudice to defendant's substantial rights) ; Rocco v. State, 37 Miss. 357,
366 (1859) (descriptive words). Identity of the injured person and the nature or grade of
the offense are examples of matters of substance. Wilburn v. State, 101 Miss. 392, 58 So. 7
(1912) (offense charged by amended indictment different from original); Com. v. Adams,
92 Ky. 134, 17 S.W. 276 (1891) (if amendment of substance allowed, the judge could usurp
the function of the grand jury) ; People v. Motello, 157 App. Div. 510, 142 N.Y. Supp. 622
(1913).
14. State v. Kusel, 29 Wyo. 287, 304, 213 Pac. 367, 372 (1923) (amendment to add
charge of attempt requisite under statute for conviction for robbery, Collins v. People, 69
Colo. 353, 195 Pac. 525 (1920) ; Sutton v. State, 54 Ga. App. 349, 188 S.E. 60 (1936).
15. State v. Leek, 85 Utah 531, 536, 39 P. 2d 1091, 1093 (1934) (names of injured per-
sons added); Potts v. State. 72 Okl. Cr. 91, 113 P. 2d 839 (1941) (statute providing for
amendment of information liberally construed) ; People v. Wright, 26 Cal. App. 2d 197, 79
P. 2d 102 (1938) (language of counts changed).
16. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1886) ; Heald v. United States, 177 F. 2d 781 (10th Cir.
1949) ; Carney v. United States, 163 F. 2d 784, 789 (9th Cir. 1947) (otherwise defendants
would be at the mercy of the court) ; Edgerton v. United States, 143 F. 2d 697 (9th Cir.
1944) (change in substance violates the Fifth Amendment, which requires grand jury indict-
ment) ; Hartzell v. United States, 72 F. 2d 569, 586 (8th Cir. 1934) ; Dodge v. United States,
258 Fed. 300, 305 (2nd Cir. 1919).
17. "The court may permit an information to be amended at any time before verdict or
finding if no additional or different offense is charged and if substantial rights of the
defendant are not prejudiced." 18 U.S.C.A. §687 (1946).
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no provision is made for amending indictments.'8 It has been held, however,
that under a Federal statute' 9 intended to eliminate the effect of all purely
technical defects, an amendment of an indictment in form only2 o is allow-
able.2 ' Such an amendment must be sufficiently definite and certain, and
not operate to take the accused by surprise or prejudice his defense in any
way.2 2 It will be noted that these are not Supreme Court cases, but they
may be indicative of a trend which will ultimately be adopted by that court.
Broader power of amendment has been advocated for many reasons,
such as simplifying procedure, 23 minimizing delay caused by insubstantial
defects, 24 and furthering the ends of justice, by "correcting evil and pro-
moting remedy.'25 A liberal tendency has been displayed by many state
courts in construing defects to be in form rather than in substance, so
as to permit amendment where amendments of form are authorized by
statute.2 6 In addition, even though the grand jury system is preserved
by most state constitutions, 27 those statutes authorizing amendment of
indictments to correspond to the proof,28 and permitting amendment of
indictments both as to form and substance, have been held neither uncon-
stitutional,2 9 nor an infringement of the right to be indicted by a grand
jury.80 Any amendment not prejudicial to the rights of the accused may
be allowed. 31 Furthermore, as relates to, the Federal Constitution, the
18. The Advisory Committee of Rules of Criminal Procedure said that the rule "con-
tinues the existing law that, unlike an indictment, an information may be amended," BENDER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE MANUAL 534 (1948), citing Muncy v. United States, 289 Fed. 780 (4th
Cir. 1923).
19. "No indictment . . . in any . . . court of the United States shall be deemed insuffi-
cient, nor shall the trial . . . thereon be affected by reason of any defect or imperfection
in matter of form only, which shall not tend to the prejudice of the defendant." 18 U.S.C.A.
§556 (1911).
20. Harper v. United States, 170 Fed. 385, 390 (8th Cir. 1909) (question of form exists
where the only defect is that some element of the offense is stated loosely and without tech-
nical accuracy).
21. United States v. Fawcett, 115 F. 2d 764 (3rd Cir. 1940).
22. Williams v. United States, 179 F. 2d 656 (1950) (substitution of name allowed).
23. Underwood v. State, 205 Ark. 864, 171 S.W. 2d 304 (1943) (broader amendatory
powers would eliminate some of the technical defenses by means of which criminals had
often escaped punishment).
24. State v. Heffelfinger, 197 Minn. 173, 266 N.W. 751 (1936) (amendment to charge
one intent rather than another where the overt acts were the same).
25. Sullivan v. Com., 157 Va. 867, 877, 161 S.E. 297, 300 (1932).
26. State v. Mullen, 151 Ia. 392, 397, 131 N.W. 679, 681 (1911,); State v. Tolla, 72
N.J.L. 515, 62 At]. 675 (1905) (name of murder victim changed); Kenney v. State, 5 R.I.
3S5 (1858).
27. E.g., ILL. CoNsT. Art. II, §8- "No person shall be held to answer for a criminal
offense, unless on indictment of a grand jury, except in cases in which the punishment is
by fine or imprisonment otherwise than in the penitentiary, in cases of impeachment, and in
cases arising in the army and navy, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war
or public danger: Provided, that the grand jury may be abolished by law in all cases."
This seems to draw a line between misdemeanors and felonies, and it may be noted in this
connection that the grand jury requirement in the Federal Constitution is restricted to "capi-
tal or otherwise infamous crimes."
28. Com. v. Liebowitz, 143 Pa. Super. 75, 17 A. 2d 719 (1941) (real name of the accused
substituted for alias he had given when indicted).
29. State v. Heffelfinger, 197 Minn. 173, 266 N.W. 751 (1936) (statute should be con-
strued to carry out its purpose to liberalize the power of the court with respect to indict-
ments).
30. People v. Sims, 257 Mich. 478, 241 N.W. 247 .(1932) (no violation of constitutional
provision that accused shall have the right to be informed of the nature of the accusation);
Chrisman v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App. 305, 210 Pac. 632 (1922).
31. People v. Watson, 307 Mich. 596, 12 N.W. 2d 476 (1944) (failure to allege venue
of the offense allowed to be corrected by amendment).
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Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as not extend-
ing the Fifth Amendment to the states in this connection. It has held
that neither the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor any
other provision of the Constitution requires a state to commence criminal
prosecutions by indictment of a grand jury, and that all that is required
is that the accused be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation.
32
The Supreme Court has indicated further that state statutes might
authorize amendment of indictments.83
There has thus been a marked, but still limited advance in the direction
of desirable procedural reform. This advance indicates that the policy
of forbidding amendment of indictments during the trial is outmoded.
3 4
There would seem to be no inherent constitutional difficulties in statutory
authorization of any type of amendment, of indictments as well as informa-
tions,8 5 as long as the defendant would not be prejudiced in facing the
amended charge. 36 Since a lack of harmony among the courts has existed
in determining just where the line between form and substance should
be drawn, this distinction should be discarded, and the court given discre-
tionary power to permit any amendment which would not deprive the
accused of any fundamental rights.
A common law decision gave adequate expression to the principle
involved by describing a state (Massachusetts) Declaration of Rights as
intended" to secure substantial privilege and benefit to the parties criminally
charged, not to require particular forms, except where necessary to the
purpose of justice and fair dealing towards the accused .. .. 37 As
long as the defendant is fully apprised of the offense and the circumstances,
and is not surprised in that the amended indictment charges something
entirely new and unexpected, there is no reason for limiting the power of
amendment. 8 Technically an amendment of form alters a grand jury
finding no less than an amendment of substance. An amendment of
substance need not prejudice the defense any more than an amendment
of form, nor an amended indictment any more than an amended informa-
tion. What is important is to assure that the accused gets a fair trial, and
if the latter may be assured, then the advantages of removing procedural
roadblocks should be paramount. Farsighted courts, in upholding statutes
which merely facilitate the pleading in a criminal case,39 have set the
32. Hurtado v. Calif., 110 U.S. 516 (1883).
33. Cf. Ex parte Bain, 121 U.S. 1, 8 (1886).
34. It is even possible to speculate as to whether the delay consequent upon the require-
ment of returning an entirely new indictment where a defect appears violates the Sixth
Amendment, which guarantees to the accused a speedy trial.
35. Although this might lead to a flood of litigation involving statutory interpretation.
36. The question of amendment after verdict presents itself. There is authority to the
effect that no amendment will be allowed after the trial. Sutton v. U. S., 157 F. 2d 661, 665
(5th Cir. 1946) (the Sixth Amendment, guaranteeing the accused the right to know the
nature and cause of his accusation, would prohibit amendment of pleadings after verdict).
But some authorities have sanctioned amendments of indictments after verdict. Com. v.
Syren, 150 Pa. Super. 32, 27 A. 2d 504- (1942); State v. Breedlove, 199 La. 965, 972, 7 So.
2d 221, 223 (1941) (statutory authorization of amendment of indictment at any time during
or after trial).
37. Com. v. Holley, 69 Mass. 458, 459 (1855) (amendment of an allegation of a former
conviction).
38. "The rights of the respondent are properly guarded by that part of the act, per-
mitting [amendment] only in case the court consider the variance not material of the case
and the respondent is not prejudiced in his defense . . ." State v. Casavant, 64 Vt. 405,
407, 23 AtI. 636 (1892).
39. See Com. v. Liebowitz, 143 Pa. Super. 75, 17 A. 2d 719 (1941).
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